number of directly elected members by 1997."6 Once a number of councillors had been directly elected, the government was unable to ignore public opinion as represented in part by grassroots pressure groups and parties.
The Chinese authorities' position on the future constitution and electoral arrangements made it seem likely that people's rights and interests would be eroded under the new regime. Furthermore, China's persistent opposition to direct elections in effect excluded the middle and working classes from participation in the system of governance. Clearly in this context, the pro-democratic groups gained broad public support in such a short period of time because they fought for greater autonomy on behalf of the public. Not all political groups were committed to the course of democracy and acting in the public interest. Their rhetoric served functionally to garner votes, but when Beijing co-opted them by, for example, appointing some members as advisors in Hong Kong, they readily changed tack. Many local party leaders then became semidependent on the approval and recognition of both the Chinese government on the public, a situation which led to clear contradictions.7
Regardless of their political positions, Hong Kong's most prominent parties have always tied their interests to socioeconomic classes: either the middle classes or the rich. Broadly speaking, they can be divided into two groups: the local bourgeoisie and the middle class reformers. Although these groups are aligned in their support of a free market and capitalism in Hong Kong, their political orientation is diametrically opposed. The bourgeoisie includes real estate developers, bankers, and wealthy businesspersons, some of whom have considerable investments in China. They are conservative and anti-democratic, and naturally became China's co-optation target. Though some may have felt a strong sense of attachment to China, most saw politics as a means to achieve profit. Since Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping opened free enterprise zones on the mainland side of the Hong Kong border in the early 1980s, they have set their eyes on the China market and on cultivating the crucial personal connections with officials required to do business effectively there. They were not about to sacrifice the privileges they enjoyed and their lucrative ties with China, and thus they advocated the more conservative approach that China preferred.8
Their opponents were the advocates of reform, that is, the indigenous liberal-minded middle class composed of lawyers, medical doctors, and teachers highly supportive of such Western values as human rights and democracy.
The June 4 Incident spurred the evolution of some of their number to effective party leadership. In spite of its middle class and professional background, the democratic leadership also secured strong support from the working class. For example, the democratic camp mobilized two million people to demonstrate against China's military crackdown on its student movement in 1989.
Segments of Hong Kong's press systems have long gravitated to one of two political camps: the Nationalists and the Communists. Not surprisingly, in the twilight of colonial rule the press system experienced a shift in favor of Communist China. The balanced, stable ideological equilibrium also began to collapse as the pro-KMT papers withdrew from Hong Kong. Substituted in its wake was a potpourri of newspapers representing different ideological spaces ranging from the depoliticized press of commercial interests to that of the economic and soon-to-be political elite such as the pro-China Communist party organ Wen Wei Po and Ta Kung Pao. The ideological conflicts in this industry no longer hinged upon the Nationalist-Communist struggle but were instead bound by both local (Hong Kong) and national (China) contradictions.9 Whereas the people of Hong Kong sought a greater degree of autonomy under the promise of "two systems," China continued to interfere in local affairs in the name of "one country."
The Hong Kong press epitomizes the struggle between pro-democratic parties and the pro-China camp. During elections, the press has split into two camps: the ideological-laden or "biased" press and the "centrist" or neutral press. Whereas the China mouthpieces, the Wen Wei Po and the Ta Kung Pao, promoted the pro-China camps, the independent press observed the professional codes of journalism and remained neutral.
During the late transition period, some newspapers were acquired by businessmen who sought to depoliticize the press to win favor with the mass public and ingratiate themselves with the Chinese authorities. Only a few independent papers remained critical of China. Capitalist acquisition however did not necessarily mean that editorial policy changed or coverage favored certain camps. The press had to conform to a dual "legitimizing creed," namely, not to undermine the legitimacy of Chinese authorities by bolstering the democratic forces while not acting to disgrace their own legiti-overtly. Accordingly, the media had to proceed extremely carefully when framing the elections and the ensuing struggles between pro-China and prodemocratic camps.'0
Parties and the 1994-1995 Elections
The 1994-95 three-tier elections served as a gauge not only of the popularity of the parties involved but also of the ideology of the press. It also marked the second time that the pro-China camp clashed directly with that of the democrats. The District Board elections came in September 1994, followed by the Urban and Regional Council elections in March 1995 and the Legco election that September. During the latter-the last election before Hong Kong reverted to China in 1997-an unprecedented 60 Legco members were elected. Legco had three kinds of members, each with its own election: a geographical constituency election (20 seats), a functional constituency election (30 seats, 9 seats more than the 1991 election), and an electoral committee election (10 seats). The number of registered voters had soared from 1.9 million in 1991 to 2.56 million in 1995.
The elections were complicated by the political row between China and Britain. The Chinese government publicly declared its refusal to recognize the 1994-95 three-tier elections carried out under the constitutional reform proposed by Governor Chris Patten in October 1992. The reform effectively secured the pro-democratic camp's place in the legislature and contradicted the Chinese authorities' original plan to ensure a pro-Beijing voice in the legislature. In retaliation, the Chinese government threatened to tear down the Legco, instituted a provisional legislature, and declared that the term of the elected legislators would expire on June 30, 1997. Although hopes of a "through train" arrangement for the political body that would allow elected members to retain their positions after the handover were fading in the wake of Beijing's reaction, many groups still put forward candidates for election.
Between the first three-tier election in 1991 and that of 1994, the configuration of the party system had changed greatly. Anticipating the election, the existing political groups realigned and new parties were inaugurated. There People were also piqued at China's unequivocal and unilateral decision to disband the Hong Kong's elected legislature and reappoint an interim body in 1997-this in spite of the fact that people in general supported the throughtrain idea. A survey released by the SCMP on January 9, 1995, showed that more than 70% of the respondents distrusted the China-appointed Preliminary Working Committee, and less than 20% believed that this body could represent the people of Hong Kong. Irritated at China's interference, 52% of those interviewed for a July 15, 1995, Ming Pao poll indicated a preference for an independent Hong Kong or a Hong Kong under British administration rather than becoming a Special Administration Region (SAR) of China. By February 1996, the SCMP reported that the percentage of those who wanted independence or British rule had dropped back to 14%.
Democratic Aspirations and Democratization
The public outcry reflected in opinion polls were significant indicators of Hong Kong's fundamental change in political structure and the thinking of its public. In the past, the colony's residents were said to be politically apa- Approaching the end of the 1980s, it appeared that the democratizing reforms had changed Hong Kong citizens' traditional values. Foregoing the passive political behaviors of the past, the public became more actively engaged in politics and pushed for a faster pace of democratization. The June 4
Incident intensified this democratic aspiration. The public also expressed its displeasure with the Chinese authorities by voting for parties critical of China. Contrary to the common notion that the public was ignorant, the middle and elite (professional) classes showed they were clearly aware of the dynamics between government and politics during Hong Kong's transition.'5
Although public demand for democratic reforms has undeniably been on the rise in Hong Kong, the public's conception of democracy is full of ambiguities. Its democratic aspiration has been instrumental and utilitarian rather than ideological.16 As the public began to understand that the political structure was not effective in safeguarding its future interests, there was awareness that Chinese "democratic reforms" were little more than populist rhetoric and not a prelude for the establishment of a democratically elected government.
The colonial government essentially had created instead a system of a nonelected executive government that consulted the people and was checked The DP did not receive such favorable coverage from the Hong Kong media. Rather, the party was subjected to four broad varieties of criticism.
First, it was charged with failing to adhere to the democratic principle. In general, the DP-framed as the advance guard of democracy-was alleged to be switching sides to the pro-China camp once it won election. It was ac- Secondly, the media commonly disparaged the party's leadership and highlighted internal rifts within the party. When a leading DP figure decided to quit politics, the alacrity with which the papers sought reactions from other members of the party created the impression that the party's leadership lacked unity. The reports gave equal play to the accusations of some members of the DP that the legislator in question was " [b] iased and narrowminded," and to the anger of the legislator who felt he had been "unreasonably renounced" by the party.25
By contrast, the papers seemed sympathetic to and forgiving of the DABHK when it was faced with a similar problem in its leadership. When
Ming Pao reports discovered that party Chairman Tsang had sought a foreign passport (thus demonstrating a lack of confidence in the soon-to-be sovereign China), the paper carried extensive reports explaining the situation and Third, the media presented the DP as a collection of incohesive and inconsistent democrats. On the whole, reporters kept a close eye on the DP and tended to expose conflicts among its membership. The SCMP reported extensively on the row between two pro-democratic camps on the issue of cooperation between the DP and the HKADPL in the election. Journalists were also sensitive to policy inconsistencies and "double standards" in the DP.
The papers noted that a rank and file member of the DP who released an internal document to the public was reprimanded, while a high-ranking member escaped punishment even though he disclosed the party electoral strategy.
The papers were also critical of the "mistake" made by Chairman Lee and other leaders who threatened to discipline a DP member resigning from his councillor's position without party approval. By contrast, Ming Pao played down any inconsistencies in the DABHK's handling of internal conflicts and party affairs.
The media's ability to reveal DP incohesiveness and inconsistency was probably due to the party's relative openness. Reports of members who allegedly voted against DP candidates in the 1995 election were not uncommon. Such incohesiveness was described as rebellious and played up in Ming Pao articles. Reports questioned party unity and claimed that "the solidarity of the liberal camp is set to take a beating" when some DP members announced their decision to leave the party.27
Fourth and finally, alleged scandals in the DP were highlighted in the press, particularly when they pointed toward party fragmentation in the face of strong challengers. Ming Pao reported the betrayal of DP members who denied that they once belonged to the party. Another member was reported to have voted against his own party candidate, thereby causing the DP to lose a district board chairman position. The paper further documented the party's criticism of a former member who spread rumors about the party and disclosed secret party documents to the media in one of the district campaigns.
Other reports centered on "angry withdrawals" from the party by founding members and important councillors despite the efforts of top-ranked leaders to retain them.28
Externally, the DP was reported as about to "disintegrate" in the face of a strong challenge and "threat." In the education functional constituency elec- 26. See Ming Pao, September 6, 1994 , and SCMP, September 7 and 13, 1994 . 27. See Ming Pao, December 25, 1994 , May 2 and June 7, 1995 , and SCMP, December 10, 1994 , April 23 and July 17, 1995 . 28. See Ming Pao, October 6 and 12, 1994 , May 2 and July 13, 1995 and SCMP, November 22, 1994. This content downloaded from 137. 
Conclusion and Discussion
The analysis of the political context, combined with the empirical poll data, creates a picture of the media environment in pre-and post-transition Hong Kong. With support from a majority of the voting public, the pro-democracy camp earned a lopsided victory in the three-tier elections of 1994-95; however, faced with taking either a position that reflected civic voices as expressed in public opinion polls or one that defended Beijing's interests, journalists ultimately gave favor to the pro-China DABHK. Interpreting the election results and media behavior using a structuralist frame analysis, it can be argued that the framing in the media's reporting served to legitimize those parties seen as representing the interests of Hong Kong's soon-to-be sovereigns from China; conversely, the framing also marginalized and delegitimized the pro-democracy forces opposed to imminent Chinese rule. to the DP members, leaders, and supporters. Economically, they are part of the middle class: 78% have received some level of college education and 39% had a monthly income over HK $10,000 (by comparison, HK $11,000 is the average for a mid-level government bureaucrat). Most political beat reporters are university graduates who belonged to radical student organizations while at school. Some reporters revealed in interviews that they were members of such liberal groups as the Hong Kong Journalist Association and that they favored a faster pace of democratization.30 Reporters and core DP members also shared backgrounds similar to the party's supporters, 28% of whom were categorized as professional or semi-professional. Nearly 25% had a university or college education. In contrast, the bulk of the DABHK's support, as reported, came from the working class and the local community (kaifong) committees. Kaifong support of the DABHK was reported to be 34% while that of the DP was only 22%. The largest block of support (27%) for the DABHK came from people with clerical or blue collar workers; slightly less than 20% had only university or college level education.31
It seems natural to conclude therefore that journalists would be likely to agree with the ideologies, platform, and policies of the DP. However, this was not the case. Hong Kong's journalists in general are imbued with a critical orientation toward the democratic camp that may be partly due to utopian and romantic expectations about democracy. There was thus a real discrepancy and discordance between what the journalists held as ideals and what politicians saw as politically expedient-in other words, differences between an abstract notion of democracy and the real politics of democracy in action.
Holding up such ideals only widened the gap between the journalists and the pro-democratic camp and eventually produced an antagonistic attitude toward the DP and its members. In fulfilling the demands of their vocation, therefore, journalists exposed the deficiencies and failings of the party structure and revealed what they described as party "scandals." The critical attitude provoked negative feelings among the DP organizers, who strongly felt that the journalists' reports were deliberately biased against them during the campaigns.
On the pragmatic side, journalists needed "unexpected and interesting events" with news value to break their news routine. Acting in a democratic way in a pro-democratic party is not worth reporting; behavior perceived as undemocratic is. It follows that whenever the DP acted in ways inconsistent with and contradictory to democratic principles-for example, changing ideologically or conflicting within or with other democratic groups-journalists were more likely to recount the story in detail. Whereas good deeds in a democratic party are no news at all, any similar activity in a party seen as supporting an authoritarian power becomes intriguing. Accordingly, journalists were eager to report acts by the DABHK normally expected from the DP.
Anticipating that the DP would disintegrate and the DABHK would flourish as the sovereignty transfer approached, journalists looked for adverse news about the DP and positive news on the DABHK.
The negative framing of DP candidates was also due to the availability of information with news value for journalists. The DP's system of information dissemination was more open than that of the DABHK. The centrality of the DABHK spokesperson system rarely allowed for disclosure of dissident opinions and dissension. By comparisons, the division of labor in the DP was much more finite and the hierarchy more complicated. The central committee and local district branches always competed to present their opinions, and this competition occasionally resulted in inconsistencies. The result was that stories of internal scandals and dissent could easily pass into journalistic circles. Owing to DP's relative lack of resources, it seldom turned down interview requests, in part to avoid the release of unfavorable news. Numerous media studies in fact have suggested that it is relatively difficult for "resource-poor," less established, or anti-governmental organizations to gain coverage in the mass media, and the coverage that is gained tends to be unfavorable.32
It is unclear why journalists appeared to favor the DABHK; the explanation may have important implications for post-transition party politics. One possibility is that they were motivated by the party's potential to both punish 
